Founding a Deleuzian School with a Derridian Name: A School without Condition
Olaf Sanders, TU Dresden

This text is an early version of the first part of a collaborative writing project. The aim of this text is to give reasons for the concept of the School without Condition that is available on www.unbedingteschule.de as a series of theses and also in a small book recently published in German (Beiler, Jung, Sanders & Thomas 2014). Concept and book are strictly theoretical, but they were written with a practical perspective in mind: to found a Deleuzian School without Condition in a village called Alfter, near Bonn and Cologne. In the meantime the activities of the local support group were ebbing more and more, while concept and theses began a life of their own as an open source. In the current discussions about an university school at the Technical University of Dresden for instance the concept and the theses seem to become practical again. But, maybe it is better not to anticipate further developments or events, since their anticipation too often means to avoid them.

A school without condition is a Deleuzian school, which does not evade the problems of the present but tries to rework them.
Gilles Deleuze remarks in Abécédaire, the seven-and-a-half-hour-long conversation his student, friend and co-author Claire Parnet had with him after his retirement, that he never wished to be the head of a school or even found a school in the first place. When Deleuze, who used to be a teacher at a lycée for some time, says school in Abécédaire, prompted by “P comme professeur,” he does not mean a school as a place where children and adolescents are taught, even though teachers are also called professeur at secondary schools in France, but a philosophical school like the Wittgensteinians or Heideggerians. Both kinds of school have in common their professed purpose of imparting or reproducing “ready-made” knowledge. Knowledge presumed to be ready-made, so people believe, needs not to be changed anymore or rather should even be protected from change. Due to the intolerance against diversion, taken for granted because of this belief and thus undetected, schools of either kind enforce control over the processes of reproduction. Control requires governance and power; and Deleuze not only wants to exercise as little governance, control and power as possible, but rather draw lines of flight from these three dispositifs. Deleuze’s own way of teaching—he calls it magistral—seems to contradict this
wish: Teaching from the front, he tried to engage single students in various processes of becoming in which they and—quite by the way—also his concepts, analyses and explanations become others. This was supposed to prevent Deleuzians from crystallizing or a Deleuzianism—even an applied one (Buchanan, 2000)—from sedimenting. Did Deleuze, who together with his co-author Félix Guattari already established in *L’Anti-œdipe* that there were neither seeming nor real contradictions “but merely degrees of humor [mais seulement des degrés d’humour]” (Deleuze/ Guattari, 1972, p. 81), fail at his project? And is the attempt to found a school based on his theory—and this means a school for children and adolescents—doomed to fail since it cannot be any more consistent than Deleuze’s own teaching practice was at first glance?

The perhaps most obvious answer to both these questions is one by Samuel Beckett, who Deleuze often refers to and to whose work he dedicated a rather long essay called *L’Épuisé*. In *Worstward Ho*, Beckett writes as laconically and humorously as we know him: “All of old. Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.” It is about attitude, maybe about this particular one, and a Deleuzian school cannot be anything but an experiment.

Deleuze never questioned that universities should be places of thought and that thinking means to experiment. Jacques Derrida was the most recent one to remind us of this task universities have. In *L’université sans condition* he proclaims universities to be the place of discussion without condition or requirements, of working and reworking all problems concerning mankind and, at the same time he points out that such a university without condition so far never existed (Derrida, 2001, p. 13 ff.). Even if we agree that the university without condition cannot exist since everything is always subject to conditions, this still does not explain why our universities nowadays are not as free of conditions as they could be. Why are they not subject to as little thought-restricting conditions as possible, but rather rapidly move in the opposite direction so that they are no longer lacking conditions as they once used to in Germany—even at large universities—e.g. ten or twenty years ago. Ivan Illich names one plausible reason for this development: the schooling of minds. And in *Deschooling Society*, he presumes: “Only a generation which grows up without obligatory schools will be able to recreate university.” (Illich, 1971, p. 31) Illich does not say without schools, but without obligatory schools. The term “obligatory” is important because it allows for the possibility to hold on to school if only it was free from the solely restricting condition of obligation. Accordingly, the requirement for the recreation of university and its further development could be a school without condition. Designing a school without condition proves as little contradictory as Deleuze’s way of teaching does at second glance. Humor acts as an anti-oedipal outlet, gradually opening the super-ego we “are usually familiar with as a strict master” (Freud, 2000, Vol. VI, p. 281), while it is working with contradictions. Taking a university that does not exist as starting point to think school anew makes sense. It creates a plane of consistency which is a
condition for thinking school differently, and this is necessary.

There are at least two problems concerning mankind at present that, in my opinion, most compel us to work on them: the climate change marking and enforcing the end of the world as we knew it (Leggewie/Welzer, 2009), and the development of a “global attention deficit disorder” (Stiegler, 2008, p. 109) corroding our care systems and rendering us structurally unable to raise the next generation to whom we leave a world that is increasingly harder and worse to live in—as we can already foresee. To solve this problem, Stiegler counts on an “écologie de l’esprit” (2008, p. 68), quoting without quotation marks Gregory Bateson’s ecology of mind (Bateson, 1972). This ecology of mind can only grow from more democracy, to quote Claus Leggewie and Harald Welzer. The third problem, which has to do with both previous problems, is that of the government often mistaking itself for an administration in post-democratic times like ours. Deleuze and Guattari adopt Bateson’s concept of the plateau which they oppose to the narrative characterized by beginning and end and usually containing at least one climax.

I will come back to the formation/explanation of democracy, the democratic organs at school and the risk of their conception being too organic. Corresponding to the two problem areas mentioned above, climate change and the becoming-world-wide of ADHD, there are time frames within which catastrophic consequences may be averted by problem-solving actions. These time frames will close in the foreseeable future—Leggewie and Welzer guess, regarding the climate change, by 2020. Something may be done against the global attention deficit problem for a little while, but certainly not for much longer. Thought schooled by Deleuze and Derrida’s writings—this thought, too, needs deschooling—is faced with particular problems of action in a perverse way. The schizoanalysis developed by Deleuze and Guattari from psychoanalysis tempts us to protect the problem from the solution since premature solutions, which are the rule, often actually lead to bigger problems, and the deconstruction Derrida introduces as more critical than all critique in L’université sans condition tends to become endless. In both cases, no solid fundaments vouching in advance for the rightness of actions will form, without which the urgently necessary actions too often fail to occur. Acting and taking on the responsibility for the shortfall in founding said actions seem indispensable and, insofar, an irremissible supplement to the Bildung (formation) of the spirit for the establishment of human affairs Adorno in his Theorie der Halbbildung (Theory of semi-Bildung) diagnosed as the lost half of Bildung. We will no longer be able to forgo Bildung in the future. Furthermore, we will no longer be able to afford thinking Bildung anthropocentrically. Especially in the first problem area, climate change, it becomes increasingly obvious that it no longer suffices to restrict ourselves to human affairs. For this project and the founding of a school without condition, reading Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari’s late works as a philosophy of Bildung seems helpful (see also Sanders, 2011 and 2015a/b).

In the following, I will constitute five more theses for the school without condition and conclude by addressing
some problems which may accompany, postpone or even prevent its actualization, that is, its real foundation that now seems not completely impossible as a university-school with the least restricting conditions.

A school without condition is not based on an image of man. It is a manifold place for singular learning processes and courses of Bildung. As a manifold, school itself is in motion. It regards itself as a learning or self-forming assembly protecting both itself and those involved in it in their singularity.

It has been contested time and again that a school without condition is not based on an image of man. Two counter questions: Why? Is it not enough that most people either working or learning at it cannot give up their images of man? This may in turn lead to this reply: Is it even desirable at all to have no image of man? And often this answer does not occur in the ethic genre of discourse or as a question but as the stating of fact: It is impossible not to have any image of man, the critics object and reason that having no image of man also means having any particular image of man is not considered to be more important than having no image of man at all. Only here does freedom begin. Man may, to actualize the famous conclusion to Foucault’s *Les mots et les choses* (1966), disappear as an image like a face in the sand on the seashore. This image of man, which in most cases is likely merely a generalization of our self-image, need not even form in the first place. Let us recall Jacques Lacan’s description of how the image formed in *Le stade du miroir* (1949), a description which—although in need of correction from an empirical point of view—is still as informative for understanding structure now as it was then. An infant (je) recognizes itself (moi) in a mirror and is happy about it. Moi is an image (image spéciale) of Je and at the same time more than that. It is an imagined future, a future perfect where that which is not one yet will already have taken Gestalt. Lacan uses the German term “Gestalt” (form or shape). Moi is also the identity affirmed by somebody else. Between Je and image, according to Lacan, a *ligne de fiction* forms on which the nascent subject, quite literally the subjected one in this case, has to solve the unsolvable problem of discordance. Identifying conception is simultaneously a misconception, and the rift will permanently permeate the gradually reinforced subject. For Lacan, only love can undo this knot of imaginary servitude. Foucault diagnoses yet another rift in the human being, one he calls an empirical-transcendental doublet in *Les mots et les choses*. This rift turns out to result from schooling on the one hand and Aufklärung (enlightenment) on the other. The docile human body—as Foucault demonstrates in particular in the chapter on discipline in *Surveiller et punir* (1975)—is dismembered once more in order to be rendered more useful for the human being-machine-coupling of the industrial age and
then reassembled while the human being, who is supposed to be more than an example of the biological species homo sapiens, is declared to be autonomous and free. This transcendental image of the human being appears, like the ego-ideal from which it was extracted, to be an unreachable point of flight, fleeing even when in motion. As such, it structures the misconception in representations directed from a central perspective.

When we take the place of the king we are as dead as he, God or the father. Fortunately we may refuse to take this place and escape succession. In this refusal a life this side of all subjectifications becomes perceptible, as described by Beckett in his novels, e.g. in *L’innommmable* (1953). The unnamable decides to no longer say “I” because it is too stupid. Giving up on images of man and pretended identities could pave the way for a line of flight out of stupidity. It would be even wiser to resist being made stupid in the first place and to elude the various oedipalizations. Deleuze and Guattari believe in flight to lead away from the name in case it manages to become a veritable proper name earned as a singularity or anomalous. The Unnamable would be such a proper name, Wolf Man another one. Those who think Beckett’s turn too radical may refer to Rimbaud’s often used (e.g., by Deleuze/ Guattari and already quoted by Lacan) phrase: *Je est un autre, I is another*. Deleuze and Guattari are not interested in structures. They consider them too rigid. In *Mille plateaux* (1980, p. 289) they subject structuralism to irony by remarking that the whole world became much wiser through it, the allegedly big revolution. Against structure they mobilize the manifold, which aside from the ritornello is probably Deleuze/ Guattari’s most important creation of concept. Manifold and ritornello open up the transcendental-empiric aesthetics their critical work builds upon. Deleuze adopts the concept of the manifold of the German mathematician Bernhard Riemann. This concept allows him to think of space as composed of heterogeneous parts which do not have to bow to any homogeneous, not even linear metric. Space may also possess *n* dimensions that need not be fixed to a point of origin. It may be mobile or altogether in motion, expand or constrict. It immediately makes sense that the Euclidian space (point of origin, three dimensions, linear metric), we are used to in our everyday usage and for representative purposes, is actually a highly specialized, very determined manifold. It also makes sense that a school considering itself to be a manifold is mobile as well and most likely also in motion most of the time. In *Mille plateaux*, Deleuze and Guattari introduce three actualizations of manifolds corresponding to three processes of becoming: pack (becoming-animal), rhizome (becoming-plant) and crystal (becoming-inorganic).

Processes of Bildung and learning are often based on processes of becoming, sweeping us along and leaving us to rest elsewhere. In this sense Bildung requires enthusiasm or, in Max Horkheimer’s words, charged by the subject-object-paradigm in *Begriff der Bildung* (Horkheimer, 1988), devotion to the thing at hand. Processes of becoming are intense processes and, therefore, temporal and neither extensive nor spatial. Ritornelli, whose rhythms—Deleuze and Guattari strictly distinguish rhythm from meter—
constantly generate new deviations, ensure that something becomes. Repetitions causing differences are the foundation of time. Time becomes perceptible in crystal images, perpetually forking and manifold. In Deleuze’s taxonomy they belong to the second big group of cinema images, the time images. Deleuze discovers time images in incompossible past strata in Orson Welles’ *Citizen Kane* (USA 1941) and time images of simultaneous present summits in *L’année dernière à Marienbad* (F/I 1961) by Alain Resnais and Alain Robbe-Grillet. Further crystal images can be found in many other films, e.g. also in Wong Kar Wai’s 1960s trilogy.

Time images are always movement images, more precisely: genetic mental images which—the way Deleuze sees them—think. Through cinema and its movement images, the image, generally pictured as a freeze frame, loses its phantom image quality. The real, which Deleuze and Guattari understand as a swirling image-sign-matter flux, is rendered representative by projection. It is constantly forming, and something is constantly forming in it. Processes of learning and Bildung are singular as non-repeatable and unpredictable movements. As a forming and learning school, the school without condition is an assembly (agencement), characterized by a certain cohesion. However, compared to the assembly it is also more transitory than a rigid structure and therefore already in need of protection. As a minority experiment it deserves this protection as much as the processes of learning and Bildung that occur in it. That it acts beyond its place in the narrow sense goes without saying. It can actually give up its place altogether by deterritorializing. A school without condition demands special requirements of territory and architecture.

A school without condition has a double reference to the future. It is open to the future because it does not anticipate events approaching us from the future as a requirement for processes of learning and Bildung. At the same time, it commits to help form a future from which events may approach us. The differend resulting from these, at times conflicted, are the foundation of school politics. A school without condition is an experiment testing the model of a school that will be sustainable in the future.

In Deleuze’s philosophy of time, mostly developed in *Différence et répétition* (1968), events (événements) approach us from the future. In modern times, the traditional or even natural cyclic concepts of time are replaced by the straight line as the representative of time, which, however, according to Deleuze, due to its own length is already made round again into an endlessly de-centered circle in which he rediscovers Nietzsche’s eternal return (Deleuze, 1968 [DR], p. 151 ff.) The future returns. It is a return/repetition itself; and Deleuze (1968, p. 125) calls the repetition of the future a royal repetition (répétition royale), since it turns the repetition, perpetually creating new differences, into a category of the future (catégorie de l’avenir). Nietzsche (1999, Vol. 4, p. 275) views Zarathustra as “the teacher of the eternal return,” making easier the thought of “a new tune,” a song, which I—for whatever reason—imagine to be like Tom Waits’ *Last Leaf* (2011). Music is the second big art of time, far older and more widespread than the cinema. The ritornello is, first of all a
musical concept referring to the baroque interlude, and whose English translation of refrain in my opinion is a bad one since in pop music’s A-B-pattern associated with the term it is not the refrain B which varies, but verse A.

Events break into habits. The new and, as such, unexpected returns to the future. This contests patterns of interpretation and therefore challenges Bildung. As the prevalent practice at schools, instruction limits possibilities of Bildung as part of the schedule and tries to keep the challenge within manageable borders. This is the purpose of lesson plans, which in the best of cases employ and make allowances for the unexpected as a means of attracting attention. A school without condition on the other hand keeps the future open. There, instruction only occurs on request.

When events approach us from the future and events are appreciated as the foundation of Bildung, then it makes sense to support the future so that it may continue to act as a provider of events. A school without condition must be, and at the same time as a school without condition need not be, an ecological school. An ecological school requires plans for the future which limit the openness to the future as much as lesson plans do. Unlike lesson plans, however, plans for the future are not entirely dispensable. In view of the two problems stated above, which without any pathos in Wolfgang Klafki’s words may be called epoch-typical key problems (Klafki, 1991, p. 29), plans which remain sensitive to the side effects of their realization would be desirable and even ethically necessary. The decisive factor is the balance of plans and openness, which enter a differend Jean-Francois Lyotard (1983) defines as insolvable by any higher rule. Thus it is distinguished from both litigation and contradiction in general. This differend is the foundation of school politics. It stretches into further cases of differend that school politics will have to learn how to handle. This can fail; the school might break from the differend. This is another reason why a school without condition is an experiment.

A school without condition is its own first project. It essentially develops, forms, supplies and organizes itself. At present, we consider a schoolyard, not as a place to spend breaks, but as an ecological-agricultural foundation to supply and experience the school.

A school without condition considers itself a democratic school. A school assembly decides on school interests. In this school assembly, all members have a vote. In cases of dispute, constitutional principles apply. Furthermore, all school members have the right to report cases of differend.

That the differend, be it those cases already mentioned or other ones, is the foundation of school policy causes the discussion with its ethical implications and challenges to be sustained in the long run. Handling cases of differend demands an ethos which makes identifying the minor party less difficult and takes the side of the minor party. This is exactly what constitutes the school ethos which itself is thus subject to perpetual discussion.

Lyotard considers differend to be unavoidable. It results from shortage. All things cannot actualize themselves at once or, only one sentence (or rather—more realistically—very few sentences) can be expressed at one moment. Brought into
play by various strategies—Lyotard calls them genres of discourse (genres de discours)—different sentences compete for the position at the end of a chain of sentences to be continued. It is always the last sentence that changes the preceding sentences and, thus, meaning and sense of the discourse. Every new sentence thus has an effect of power shifting meaning and sense. For Lyotard, kinds of discourse are nobody’s strategy. As in Foucault’s theory of power, this power acts anonymously. Each power tries to make its consequences and effects seem legitimate. Legitimacy emerges from the transformation of cases of differend into litigations where the non-expressed, perhaps even inexpressible, positions and the associated legal wrong cannot articulate themselves and often cannot even be articulated. Taking the side of the minor party also means contesting the legitimacy of litigation, which Lyotard introduces as the general form of discussion and not only the judicial one as its model, as well as seeing to it or helping that the non-articulated can be articulated. Taking the side of the minor party also means contesting the legitimacy of litigation, which Lyotard introduces as the general form of discussion and not only the judicial one as its model, as well as seeing to it or helping that the non-articulated can be articulated. Since this practice names injustice and thereby creates new injustice, differend results in further differend. Therefore an ethics of differend has to aim for as little injustice as possible to prevail. Even a policy of differend serves the approximation of this goal. Due to shortage and lack, injustice in general remains irreversible. Yet it remains an unanswered question whether lack and shortage are just as constitutional as the canonical fictions of capitalistic economy or the underlying Bildung of a fictional line suggest in Lacan’s Le stade du miroir. Lack may prove to be a product of neurotic structure, whereas the products of a psychotic machine mirror no lack. Deleuze and Guattari show in L’AntiŒdipe and repeat in Mille Plateaux: There is no lack in the real. Lack mostly results from practices that produce it, and these practices can be changed. Their change could become the object of political discourse if it prevailed with competing objects in the differend. Could this radically reduce lack? It could be expected.

Jacques Rancière also does not view the political to be limited to the symbolic. To him, logos is never only linguistic usage but always bound to the calculation opened up by linguistic usage. In La Mésentente (1995), he explains politics with the fact that not everybody is capable of speaking their rights, because many are not even acknowledged as having the right to be considered beings of speech. It is not enough to have a voice, there also has to be the possibility to express desires and interests. In Mille Plateaux, Deleuze and Guattari point out more than once that a majority need not be the majority in numbers. Rancière sees the task of politics in shifting the partition of the sensual so that more and more non-participants take part and thereby obtain at least part of their part. Emancipation proves to be a movement into perceptibility in a quite elementary way. Rancière writes an emancipatory aesthetics. Based on this aesthetics, less inequality means expressing the presupposed equality of articulating beings for as many of these beings as possible—Rancière uses the term “announcement” in this context—and, thus, means providing the possibility to contribute to the political discourse. This discourse needs a form. Is there something like the best form? Do we already know it? Can this be decided a
priori? The answer to all three questions is probably “no” or “not necessarily.”

The concept of the school without condition implements a school assembly, a school court and an ethics board. This mirroring of the separation of powers and constitutional principles is meant to be a basic condition for a democratic school. What can be developed from this democratic organization? Is there a need for more disorganization? Is the rejection of organs conducive? Even those that stood the test of democracy? Must the school, too, create its body without organs? All answers to these questions would be rash and premature. The questions deserve to be protected from all too obvious answers. Deleuze follows Spinoza, all in all his most durable and important reference throughout the history of philosophy, even when it comes to democracy. Baruch de Spinoza declares democracy to be the least evil in his unfinished Tractatus politicus. Democracy, he argues, is only preferable to aristocracy, the rule of the best, because even the best will sooner or later be corrupted by or become corrupt through power. This is why they sometimes display ubuesque traits. Descendants of Alfred Jarry’s King Ubu seem to rule in post-democracy: “Uh! I succumb to temptation (Ah! je cède à la tentation).” Chapter XI in Spinoza’s Tractatus ends abruptly so that we may only speculate whether he himself would have come back to the free multitude (multitudo libera) he writes about in chapter V (§ 6), saying that it establishes a state which offers hope for the creation of life. The free multitude cannot be constituted as anything but democratic and in this regard a school without condition is similar to a state established by a free multitude. Spinoza distinguishes the free multitude from the subjected one under martial law, affected by fear and merely trying to survive. Multitude is a manifold. Deleuze and Guattari, however, rarely use the concept, in Mille Plateaux e.g., only for “a multitude of black holes” and “a multitude of plans (plans) for Nietzsche’s The Will to Power” (Deleuze/Guattari, 1980, p. 279 and 329) throughout the remains of Nietzsche’s final productive years. Plans also means planes (planes), which in Deleuze and Guattari play an important role as planes of immanence or consistency, of composition and of reference. As a manifold, the free multitude is a good model for the school’s self-government aiming to comply with the art of not being governed the way Foucault also calls critique (1990). In Mille Plateaux, which repeats the composition of Spinoza’s Ethica and the subsequent Tractatus politicus in a good way, this way is one generating difference (Sanders, 2010, p. 131), Deleuze and Guattari talk about the pack whose movements may run counter to or cause differend in the formalities of the school assembly. The pack will anarchically set and keep the democratic organization and thereby change it.

Policy and pedagogy are based on ethical principles. Since there is no commonly acknowledged ethical system, the school ethos is subject to constant discussion as well.

What the missing conclusion to Spinoza’s Tractatus and the book on Marx Deleuze never got to write do not address is talked about by Deleuze and Guattari’s friends and interpreters Antonio Negri und
Michael Hardt in their Empire trilogy, comprised of Empire (2000), Multitude (2004) and Commonwealth (2009). They develop Spinoza’s concept of the multitude with profound knowledge of Deleuze and Guattari’s thought. Hardt and Negri (2000, p. xiv) perceive Empire as the “new megamachine,” encompassing the whole world and ruling without bounds. This boundlessness is not restricted to space only but befalls time as well. The constitution of Empire marks the end of history. Yet when history ends, the future too will disappear. Together with the future, the event disappears; and when there are no longer any events, Bildung is rendered unnecessary. It loses its value; and its almost complete devaluation is what we experience at present.

Above, Bildung was introduced with reference to Adorno’s Theorie der Halbbildung. Adorno in this lecture defines Bildung as the process through which a subject appropriates culture. The unusual term “appropriate” indicates that culture is not acquired, that it is absorbed into the subject, but resists consumption. Adorno sees culture as high culture and Bildung as the Bildung of the spirit accordingly. Yet Bildung of the spirit is just one half of Bildung. Its other half shows itself in standing up for the “establishment of human affairs,” so that these affairs will be established in increasingly better ways for more and more people in the course of historical and societal process. Halbbildung results from giving up on this task. Adorno sees Schiller’s letters Über die ästhetische Erziehung as a felicitous composition of the concept of Bildung, since for the first time ever it formulates a theory of the balance between the necessary accommodation to society and the defense against the pressure of accommodation resulting from this necessity. Schiller bases political Bildung on the aesthetic fundament of being brought up by beauty (die Schönheit). This figure no longer works today, faced with the long barbaric 20th century, yet this does not preclude a contemporary reformulating of Schiller’s project as ventured by Rancière, or rather makes it seem desirable. Adorno talks about a socialized Halbbildung, because being brought up to be consumers by the culture industry and—as should be amended with Illich—by schools, atrophies the second branch of Bildung. When Vienna philosopher Konrad Paul Liessmann (2006, p. 70) detects the second stage of the atrophy, the concept of Bildung is subject to in the society of knowledge, supposed to be ours, then he means to say that the idea of Bildung has lost all normative and regulative functions as becomes more than clear in the lack of wit and spirit celebrated by mass media (Greif, 2005). Yet the concept of knowledge itself can already be considered the second stage of the atrophy of Bildung, followed only by one more: information. After that, there is only noise. Between Bildung and knowledge, there is still cognition linked with interest and gaining cognition should be what the teachings and research at universities aim for (Brandt, 2011). Bildung would be cognition plus ethically founded attitude. If the in-between, as interest may also be called, disappears, the only remains of cognition will be knowledge, which without either well-founded structure or taxonomy decomposes into information. Of course, knowledge alone is not enough. Nietzsche (1999, Vol. 13, p. 189) already detects “a
kind of immorality in [...] the will to system,” expressed even more clearly in database capitalism which develops in the wake of knowledge decaying to information to be stored in databases. Databases replace the old narratives as the prevalent symbolic form and that means the way we construct both ourselves and our world, thereby creating a future without future.

Without a future, there is nothing left to decide; and when there is nothing left to decide, then democracy will become dispensable as a legitimate practice of decision. The only thing needed will be accommodation. To accommodate people to Empire and to sustain itself this way, Empire rules in all registers of social order right down to its bottom. The paradigmatic form of its totalitarian regime is Foucault’s biopower, supplemented by the psychopower diagnosed by Stiegler. In his later works, Foucault (2001) draws a line of flight back to the Stoics and actualizes their epimeleia heautou, care of the self, as a host of practices allowing the self access to the truth. Finding an access to truth is important and difficult in Empire, which neo-liberally takes capitalism to extremes, because in Empire the whole, as Adorno in Minima Moralia writes under the heading Zwergobst, is still always and more than ever the untrue. We have to learn how to read the flickering in the matrix the way Neo (Keanu Reeves) does in The Matrix (USA 1999) and must follow up the reading of signs with the right consequences like Truman Burbank (Jim Carrey) in The Truman Show (USA 1998) after the spot light fell down from the studio ceiling. The fingers belong even inside the tiniest holes between the blinding correlations as they do inside wounds. Caravaggio’s painting The Incredulity of Saint Thomas (1601) already showcases this. David Graeber formulates the dilemma of present critique and a possible way out of it at the end of the first chapter in Dept (2011, p. 19): “For a very long time, the intellectual consensus has been that we can no longer ask Great Questions. Increasingly, it’s looking like we have no other choice.” Let us use the choice as a chance—and ascend from information to knowledge and cognition all the way up to Bildung once more. This way is one everyone will have to go by themselves. The process of emancipation is one that has to be passed through by one’s self. In the course of this process of Bildung, the destroyed common must be recreated and furnished with a value hors prix (Hardt/Negri, 2009).

Rancière shows in La maître ignorant (1987), a book he comes back to at a pivotal place in La Mésentente, that we all can emancipate ourselves. That may be accomplished all alone or with the help of emancipated teachers. Rancière calls those teachers emancipated who abstain from creating an artificial or stultifying hierarchy of knowledge through instruction and merely allow will and concentration to take effect. Will and concentration are necessary requirements for processes of learning and Bildung that processes of emancipation are comprised of. In order to learn, different people, who according to Rancière all have a part in the one intelligence expressed by all things human, need different quantities of will and concentration; and the required quantity may even be big enough as to be impossible to obtain in the remaining lifetime. But even this is no objection to possibilities of learning and Bildung, and
to seize these possibilities ourselves is the key to emancipation. Deleuze and Guattari express the inequality or singularity of human and other beings in a concept they hope will overcome anthropocentrism. The concept is called anomal. Each and every thing that lives is ultimately an anomal and, as such, equal. At the same time, no anomal equals or resembles another one. They all are essentially different. All anomal are therefore both equal and unequal; they have equal rights and different qualities, demands or desires. The broad concept of life Deleuze and Guattari create—they even know anorganic life like the crystalline life described above—compels all those living and learning at the school to take sides with all who cannot express anything, for example the inhuman, yet nonetheless endangered things and nature, or also in reference to the future of the not yet born. Anomal will have to defend themselves even against this demand. Bildung shows itself in the balance the micro-politics at school will have to find again and again. Eventually, Bildung proves itself in how it handles the irresolvability of differend and surplus. Pedagogy and politics at a school without condition are based on the same ethical orientations.

A school without condition can only be founded against resistance.

Inventing a school without condition in writing is not the same as founding it. Founding is a palpable contribution to the recreation or regaining of the common.

Based on the three axioms, being exempt from an image of man, the double reference to the future and democracy founded on differend, school practices like projects, games and idleness, special demands for territory and architecture, as indicated above, as well as scientific supervision can be deliberated upon. Scientific supervision is supposed to render the risks of experiment visible and assessable, and, as shown above, a school without condition always is an experiment. It is also supposed to help improve dealing with these risks in a responsible way and to develop or enhance, respectively, methods of documenting the school’s process and so on. Those deliberations assemble into a small or minor theory of the school without condition, which gains more and more consistency as does the concept. This consistency is the result of collective paperwork. We are more than Deleuze and Guattari, who at the beginning of Mille Plateaux already remark they were many and kept proliferating. The collective writing experience is a thoroughly positive one, although it too showed that there is one animal singled out in every pack, white rat or white whale or whatever, that is an anomal in a special way. In the meantime, the concept has received much recognition.

Yet paper is known to be patient and websites are as well, whereas school founders are not, especially when it is their children who are supposed to attend this imagined school. This is when time-frames abruptly open and then close. Paperwork has gained a new value for the concept group which the remaining members of the first founding group in Alfter, a village near to Bonn, cannot always comprehend. Since concept and theory ultimately are the only thing we have, a kind of hierarchy develops which Rancière wished to avoid and which an initiative to found a school should avoid as well. Instead of doing it
oneself and working on one’s own emancipation, the self-organization of work in the foundation of a school, as well as the numerous occasions of learning and Bildung are being avoided. Even though it is still comfortable nowadays to remain unautonomous, something is happening. We do something against hierarchy. But, even a group’s self-organization requires patience. People have to be able to wait; Godot does not arrive on many evenings when we have our group meetings.

If everything went according merely to the group’s early plans, we would long have been working on a field report like the one George Dennison (1969) wrote on First Street School. There is a longing for the future perfect. Time and again, there are quite active members in the group who give up when faced with the discrepancy between what can be accomplished and what should be accomplished. Acceleration slows down, gaps of recognition gape open.

We have not yet managed to get an appointment with the Ministry of Education to present and discuss our school outline. So we won’t be a public school test for now. North-Rhine Westphalia does not want any presents. Truly re-thinking school seems to be undesired. It calls for courageous education politics.

We also tried the alternative of founding a school without condition as a state-approved private school that, according to law, may be founded as a substitute school in its own right in North-Rhine Westphalia. Schools in their own right are schools which do not adhere to the organization and curriculum established schools employ. There are no such schools in North-Rhine Westphalia—except Waldorf schools, which are indeed schools in their own right, but far more similar to public schools than our project. Yet without a model or regulation, a regional administration can hardly come to a decision. The way leads back into the educational politics of the federal state or on towards accommodating a model of school that is already established. Without classes, grades, divisions and subjects, most people cannot think school, no matter if they are professionally involved in creating the system of education or not. There seems to be an unspoken Denkverbot (prohibition on thought). Slavoj Žižek uses the German term “Denkverbot” (Žižek, 2002, p. 167). The de-schooling of minds seems to have hardly begun; the trees growing in our brains as a result are made of hard, bent wood. This is why we are also concerned with the de-schooling of minds.

Further alternatives would be immigrating to an adjacent federal state or the Europe of abroad. Reforming an existing school into a school without condition would also be conceivable: Occupy local primary school.

That is the current state of affairs in the Rhineland. Until the realization becomes possible, the concept lives on in the virtual which replaced Schiller’s beautiful soul as the storage medium, and there it keeps affecting, drawing imperceptible lines of flight—even into other parts of the world.

Just now, one line of flight becomes visible in Saxony where a group of students, scientists, and professors discusses the concept of the school without condition in order to found an university school. Maybe the TU Dresden will be the right place or space for a specific school without condition yet to come.
References


Greif, Mark (2005). The reality of reality TV. n + 1 #3, 165–174


Jarry, Alfred (1896). *Ubu roi*. www.gutenberg.org/catalog/world/read
file?fk_files=1505943 (29. November 2011)


Musil, Robert (1978). Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften I. Reinbek near Hamburg: Rowohlt


Sanders, Olaf (2015a). Greatest Misses. Über Bildung, Deleuze, Film, neuere Medien etc. Hamburg: Katzenberg


Žižek, Slavoj (2002). Revolution at the Gates (Selected Writings of Lenin from 1917). London: Verso

Acknowledgements
Thanks to Janine Jacobs for translating most parts of this text and to all those who discussed the idea and concept with me over the last few years, especially Frank Beiler, Thomas Jung and Phillipp Thomas.
Author Details
Olaf Sanders is Professor for systematic educational science at the Technische Universität Dresden. His field of research includes theories of Bildung, popular cultures and media, particularly film and TV series, and their philosophical foundations. Postal address: TU Dresden, Fakultät Erziehungswissenschaften, Institut für Erziehungswissenschaft, Professur für Systematische Erziehungswissenschaft, 01062 Dresden (Germany). He can be contacted via e-mail: olaf.sanders@tu-dresden.de.