Figuring Out Ineffable Education

Lynn Fendler
Michigan State University, USA.

Abstract *Using devices from classical rhetoric, this essay draws a distinction between representational language and figurative language. That distinction is extended as an analogy for thinking about education, outlining the possibility that figurative education might be something other than representational education. Representational language and figurative language establish two different constellations of power relations between knowledge and people, and two different conceptual horizons for imagining what education might mean. Capitalizing on the epistemological fallout that occurs when representational language shifts to figurative language, this essay tries to come to terms with the differences between representational education and figurative education in order to imagine other ways of being educated. It concludes by gesturing toward ineffable values of ethics, intimacy, and generosity.*

> Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur *dichten.*
> Ludwig Wittgenstein (1977, p.53)

Introduction

Last year I convened a doctoral seminar that evolved over the semester into a unique educational experience. Reflecting on the course during the last meeting, we found ourselves at a loss for words. The usual language for talking about education—curriculum, pedagogy, knowledge, skills, and dispositions – did not help us describe what we did. We could not find suitable language in critical pedagogy, experiential learning, narrative story, poetic inquiry, Deweyan experience, or discourse analysis, either. We failed to put into words what happened during the semester, and how this class felt unlike other courses or other educational experiences. Interestingly, everyone seemed to share a similar impression: we knew

Lynn Fendler
Michigan State University, U.S.A.
fendler@msu.edu

that something educationally different had happened, but what we did was somehow unspeakable.

The failure of language in itself is intriguing – especially when you're trying to write about it – and this essay relates some of my efforts to come to terms with the ineffable in education. How can I tell a true story – any story – about education when available language does not suffice? In the process of searching for strategies that might help me address the limits of how it is possible to talk about education, I found myself caught in figures of speech: language that gestures beyond and outside itself. In this essay, I import figurative language as a metaphor for other education.

First, a little bit about the class, by way of *descriptio*.[1] This was a one-semester elective doctoral seminar in Philosophy of Education offered through the Department of Teacher Education at a large public university in the United States. We met once a week for three hours at a time, and we maintained an open-access online document for optional communications during the week. The 12 participants in the class came from a variety of academic backgrounds including English, Math, Rhetoric & Composition, English as a Second Language, Special Education, and Social Studies. I was the only one who had had any previous experience in philosophy, and only one other person had previously taken courses in philosophy of education. Three different native languages were represented among people in the class.

Spurred by my recent reading of Jacques Rancière's work, I was inspired to launch the course with Bingham & Biesta's (2010) book, *Jacques Ranciere: Education, Truth, Emancipation.* Also, in an attempt to "walk the talk" of Rancièrian ethics, the course was designed collectively and by consensus among all participants. During the first class meeting, we decided on a basic approach: we would plan for the course in three-week chunks and reassess after each chunk; we would re-read the Bingham & Biesta book two more times during the semester; we would study the philosophy of economics; we would read Foucault; and we would focus on Web 2.0 as both a topic of study and a communication technology for the course.

Most of the inspiration and ideas for this essay came from the people in the Philosophy of Education course, for which I extend heartfelt gratitude. Methodologically, this essay draws from old-fashioned rhetoric as a springboard for coming to terms with ineffable features of contemporary education.

---

[1] *Descriptio*: "an image or setting that establishes an emotional affiliation for the reader." This definition and others to follow have been taken from various easily accessible online references like *Silva Rhetoricae*: http://rhetoric.byu.edu/

Lynn Fendler

The Linguistic Turn as a Pedagogical Metaphor

> A game is a game is a game.
> Wittgen Stein

Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, European linguistics and anthropology advanced the theory of structuralism stipulating that language represents meaning. They established this ontology by formulating a two-tiered reality system: 1) the visible surface layer of the messy, flawed, and transitory language we speak in real life; and 2) the invisible underlying layer of fixed meanings, perfect grammar, and stable reality. In structuralism, words represent – that is, signify – underlying meanings. I have been interested for a long time in the linguistic turn: the late twentieth-century shift in Western social theory that undermined structuralist assumptions about how language works.

Poststructuralist social theories, those after the linguistic turn, tend to regard the representational functions of language as rather quaintly old fashioned: "Isn't it interesting that people used to think language could represent meaning!" Since the linguistic turn, social theories have had to address the disconcerting premise that language stands alone as its own thing, not representing any meaning at all, but performing or gesturing in a metaphorical way toward the ineffable. For social theory, at least since Wittgenstein, if we want to understand how the world works, we have to figure out how language works, which may turn out to be representational, performative, and/or figurative (Perloff, 1996).

Epistemologically aligned with poststructuralist social theories, rhetorical studies have taken the position that language is not representational and does not function as a medium for meaning. From a rhetorical point of view, it is possible to believe that language (all language) works more like poetry (gesturing and evoking) than like mathematics (symbolizing and signifying).[2] From a playfully rhetorical perspective, we can look at it this way: to use language *as if* it represented reality would be to employ the trope of *inventio*, a rhetorical move I might make if I imagined that the illusion of representational language would persuade my listeners to take my argument more seriously.

When we draw a distinction between representational language and figurative language, and extend that distinction analogously to think about education, then it becomes possible to imagine that figurative education might be something other than representational education. Capitalizing on the epistemological fallout that occurs when representational language shifts to figurative language, in this essay I am trying to come to terms with the differences between representational education and figurative education as a way of fathoming what has sometimes been ineffable.

---

[2] Granted, it is possible to think figuratively about mathematical symbolism.

Representational Education

A (modern, structuralist) social-science theory typically assumes that meaning can be represented by language. Similarly, a (modern, structuralist) social-science educational theory typically assumes that knowledge can be represented by educational practices like teaching and curriculum. On the surface of it, that distinction might appear to be ontologically neutral. However, there is always already power afoot. When language or education is assumed to be representational, a hierarchy of authority is established in which texts and institutional practices have more inherent dignity than readers or students. Within representationalism, texts are assumed to *have* meaning, and education becomes a process in which readers *find* meaning.[3] The epistemological commitments of modern social-scientific education thereby set up a foundational assumption of inequality in which texts are authoritative, and people are receptive.

Since the social-scientific representational worldview is currently so pervasive, I suspect this foundational assumption has constructed some fairly effective limits around how it is possible to think about education. Traditionally, educational practices play a role that is analogous to representational language: curricular and pedagogical practices deliver, mediate, and/or explain meaning in a way that makes knowledge accessible to students. Even in constructivist pedagogies that are enacted through inquiry-based activities, curricula and standards usually (but not always) contribute to the assumption that the knowledge generated in the activities will be (re)constructed by students in their own minds, and that a teacher's job is to design activities that are effective in facilitating that construction of knowledge. Either way there is a relationship of inequality concocted between students and knowledge in which the object-text has more authority, and more inherent value, than the subject-student. To render that asymmetry in more dramatic terms, we could say that representational education is based on the premise that the student will be changed by knowledge, not that knowledge will be changed by the student.

Figurative Education

Figurative language does not have a representational function, so it constructs a relationship between the text and the reader that is unlike the relationship constructed in representational language. By analogy, in figurative education, knowledge is not represented by educational practices. Imagining figurative education, we may have to address the disconcerting premise that education stands alone as its own thing, not representing any meaning at all, but rather gesturing in a metaphorical way toward the ineffable. Figurative language does not represent meaning; figurative language makes evocative gestures. By analogy, figurative

---

[3] This relationship forms the basis for thinking in terms of "objectivity," in which meaning is assumed to be located in the object.

education does not represent knowledge; figurative education makes evocative gestures. Figurative education, like figurative language, may catalyze, spark, inspire, generate, move, provoke, and/or persuade, but it does not represent, convey, deliver, or provide.

Politically speaking, representational language and figurative language establish two different constellations of power relations between knowledge and people, and two different conceptual horizons for imagining what education might mean. Within representational language, education is supposed to make me a better person by helping to remediate my ignorance. Within figurative education however, education is supposed to make me a better person by expecting that I will have my way with a text, and make of it what I will. Figuration is a non-instructional, non-remedial, and non-therapeutic form of address. Figurative education evokes meaning in me, for better or worse.

In figurative education, the role of the teacher is not to represent, but to evoke, inspire, and maybe even provoke the creation of meaning. Rancière's ignorant schoolmaster aligns fortuitously with the image of figurative teaching[4] in which explanation – as representation of meaning – can only obstruct and stultify. That is, when teachers provide an explanation, and attempt to insert an explanation between a text and a student, then the teachers' explanations just compound the learning burden by giving students twice as many texts to try to make sense of: the original one and the teacher's explanation. More importantly, it is disrespectful to assume that one person's (say, the teacher's) creation of meaning should take precedence over another person's (say the student's) creation of meaning.

Critiquing the "master explicator," Rancière describes the role of the emancipated reader/writer as "aesthetic autonomy" (2006, p. 27). The emancipated reader reads all texts *as if* they were figurative. The emancipated reader assumes a position of equality – not deference, receptivity or dependency – relative to the text. Within these ethical parameters, to be emancipated means to participate in educational practices *as if* they were sources of inspiration, not sources of remediation.

Figuring it Out

As a strategy for fathoming what has sometimes been ineffable, I take inspiration from some arcane rhetorical figures. Centuries ago, mastery of these rhetorical figures was the primary stuff of education. *Paideia* and Scholasticism were based on the assumption that precise knowledge of figurative language was necessary for literacy. The great scientist Aristotle included rhetoric as one of the most important components of worldly knowledge. The curriculum of the first universities was

---

[4] With much appreciation I trace this insight directly back to our discussions in the Philosophy of Education class.

based on the Trivium, namely rhetoric, grammar, and logic. To be educated meant to decipher *poesis,* the complex ways language functions to create meaning by means of linguistic devices, which, in modern times, constitutes a critical point of departure for thinking about education otherwise.

Classical rhetoric has prompted alternative perspectives to modern social-science ways of thinking, and I am playing here with the possibilities of figurative education on several levels: from foundational epistemology through provocation, persuasion, and poetic license. Just for fun, this section is organized according to the classical Aristotelian categories of logos, pathos, and ethos.

Figures of Logos
When we think about education in terms of social sciences, the paradigm of logos is the syllogism. For example:

> All children are naturally curious.
> All elementary students are children.
> Therefore all elementary students are naturally curious.

Syllogistic reasoning, which is evaluated on the basis of truth tables, forms the framework for judgments of validity, which is the foundation of modern educational sciences. For example, it is possible to think about teaching in terms of the following syllogism:

> Effective teaching requires effective classroom management techniques.
> Behavioristic techniques are effective practices for classroom management.
> Therefore, effective teachers practice behavioristic techniques.

If we remain within traditional syllogistic logic, one possible critique of the preceding syllogism would be to argue the following:

> Some punishments are effective classroom management techniques.
> All punishment is morally repugnant.
> Therefore some effective classroom management techniques are morally repugnant.

The latter syllogism implies that we judge classroom management techniques not on the basis of their effectiveness, but on the basis of their moral implications instead.
If we think about syllogistic reasoning from the perspective of modern social

science, then we are inclined to think about logic in terms of exposition (i.e., expository writing), in which logical reasoning is understood to be representational of rational processes, in a quasi-objective sense. In terms of power relations, this foundational assumption casts readers/writers in a position of being subject to the laws of expository rationality.[5]

In rhetoric, the syllogism is only one of many possible figures of logos. In practice we can draw from an array of logical arguments to support various stances about educational possibilities. For example, *ratiocinatio* is a classical figure of logos that means to reason by posing and then answering questions as in:

> How does standardized testing promote social justice?
> Because test results hold teachers accountable for reaching all students.

Another figure of logos is *dirimens copulatio,* in which one claim is qualified with a contrary claim, such as:

> Standardized tests were intended to hold teachers accountable for reaching all students, so it is unfortunate that high-stakes tests have instead had the effect of reducing educational opportunities for the poorest students.

The point of these examples is to illustrate that there are many different figures of logos that construct different types of warrants for claims, all of which can be called reasonable. If we read these claims as if they were figurative, then we position ourselves as less beholden to textual authority and less constrained by narrow laws of logic.

It is already refreshing to imagine that there are not one but many figures of logos that can be mobilized within reason to support and oppose various claims. Most importantly, however, from the epistemological perspective of figurative language, syllogisms (and other figures of logos) are recognized as strategies of persuasion, not as representations of universal laws.[6] When we see all tropes of logic and reasoning as figurative, then we take on a different subject position relative to the argument; we no longer feel so determined by transcendental laws of logic. We may be persuaded by a logical argument, but that is not the same thing as

---

[5] In this respect, it is amazing to consider the degree to which this modern expository epistemology constitutes a dramatic departure from the earlier Kantian construction of categories in which logical rationality was regarded as an inherent human faculty, brooking no distinction between the objective and the subjective.

[6] The limitations of representational logos are even more apparent when we acknowledge that all syllogisms are ultimately enthymemes: at least one premise is tacitly assumed.

obeying a law. In Rancière's (1991) terms, we are in our own "orbit" (p. 59). When we think of rationality in terms of figures of logos, we are emancipated from dictation, but we do not have to jettison all hope for logical reasoning in the process. Reason is operationalized in figures of logos, which are available to all readers and writers as means of persuasion and targets of critique, rather than as regulations to comply with or standards to live up to.

Among various figures of logos, explanation is still a complicated problem for education. Explanation is usually a figure of amplification such as *exergasia*, which is repetition of the same idea with minor changes to the words or the delivery. Or explanation could be *synonymia*, which is the use of several synonyms together to amplify or illustrate a given subject or term. In our Philosophy of Education class, Rancière's problematisation of explanation was happily disquieting: without explanations, our educational habits became dysfunctional. Explanation became a major topic of discussion that we revisited several times: If we paraphrased a text, did that mean we were explaining, and thereby being both unethical and pedagogically ineffective? What is the difference between discussing a text and explaining a text? What about the teacher's role: if I spoke for several minutes in response to a direct question, was that the same thing as explaining? Are all lectures explanations? What can lectures do besides explain? During conversations, how could we avoid the pathetic irony of explaining Rancière's philosophy to ourselves and to each other?

At a rather fundamental level, then, confronting the differences between representational language and figurative language around the issues of explanation presented us with contrasting epistemologies. These distinctions undermined our assumed places in the educational system to such an extent that we no longer had sufficient language to talk about what we were doing.

Figures of Pathos

> We had a great class tonight.
> We moved from muddied understanding
> to complete bewilderment.
> > Katy Heyning

Sometimes an argument is persuasive because it elicits an emotional response, and Aristotle called this pathos. Figures of pathos may evoke any element along the entire spectrum of human emotion – from exhilaration to apathy, and from disgust to compassion – in service of an argument. In Aristotle's (pre-Cartesian) theory of rhetoric, pathos does not replace logos; rather, pathos complements logos. An argument can fail to be persuasive when any one of its dimensions – logos, pathos, or ethos – is weak or ineffective.

For Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, figures of pathos are necessary components of effective

communication. However, pathos has an ambiguous standing within modern social-scientific languages of education that value Cartesian rationality unpolluted by emotions. In an effort to be more scientific, educators these days tend to use the terms *classroom management* and *motivation* to talk about practices that rhetoricians would call figures of pathos. For example, a display of passionate interest is regarded as a desirable characteristic of teaching. Psychologists might call that motivation; rhetoricians would call that *exuscitatio*, which means to stir others by one's own passion for the topic.

As for other figures of pathos, teachers and teacher educators also display a high tolerance for *epimone*, the persistent repetition of the same plea in much the same words. Most educators would probably not recognize the labels of *apagoresis* (a statement designed to inhibit someone from doing something) or *perclusio* (a threat against someone, or something), even though statements such as "If you do not study you will fail the exam," and "Assignments submitted after the due date will lose points" might be some of the most frequently uttered speech patterns in classroom settings.

As a strategy for theorizing the differences between good education and effective education, it is useful to analyze how figures of pathos are used in advertising compared with how teaching methods are evaluated in educational research. Everyone knows that advertisers care only about effectiveness: "What will make people buy this?" regardless of what "this" is. Advertising research uses focus-group research very efficiently to test the persuasive effectiveness of various marketing techniques. Much educational research is designed in exactly the same way as advertising research. Educational researchers use classrooms as if they were focus groups to test the persuasive effectiveness of various teaching techniques: "What will make people learn this?" regardless of what "this" is. When we recognize the similarities between marketing research and educational research, we can see that they are both amoral; the ethical poverty of research on effectiveness becomes apparent. Research on *effective* education can tell us nothing at all about whether education has any value. When we analyze advertisements and pedagogical techniques in terms of figures of pathos, it becomes easier to articulate the distinction between good and effective, thereby setting up an educational context in which values can be more easily appreciated and critiqued.

Figures of Ethos
> I've got no voice; I don't know how to write like myself.
> Hunter S. Thompson
> (interlocuted by Paul Kemp in *The Rum Diary*)

The persuasive effectiveness of an argument is also shaped by *ethos*, the character and credibility of the speaker/author. Even when the logic of an argument is

unassailable, and the case has irresistible emotional appeal, the argument will fail to persuade if the author/speaker is perceived to be untrustworthy or malicious. Figures of ethos are related to charisma, and are employed to strengthen the persuasiveness of an argument by creating an image of the speaker/author as someone who is knowledgeable and benevolent.

One typical figure of ethos is *anamnesis*, which means to establish credibility by citing a past author from memory. *Litote*s is a device for expressing modesty, such as self-deprecating humor, that is used to gain the audience's favor. *Cacozelia* is a stylistic affectation such as inserting foreign words into one's speech to appear more erudite. Across these examples we can see that one figure of ethos may be more effective than another, depending on the particular audience. An ethos of professional distance or inscrutable authority might come across as trustworthy to some listeners, while an ethos of down-home chumminess will have a more persuasive appeal for others.

We can think about figures of ethos to challenge assumptions not only about how a speaker creates an image, but (by extension) also how a reader or listener creates a subject position. The ethos of a speaker pertains to the character of the speaker; the ethos of a listener pertains to the character of the listener. As a strategy for coming to terms with the ethos of the reader, I ask, "Was tut der Text?"[7] a question that becomes an exercise in aesthetic engagement. To ask, "What does the text do?" means to monitor one's own affective—aesthetic—responses while reading or listening: Who am I as a reader of this text? Am I becoming bored? As a reader, do I feel respected and/or patronized? Does my reading spark memories, insights, or moments of reverie? Do I feel trusted by the text? Who does the text think I am? This line of questioning establishes a critical perspective on the ethos of the reader.

With the notable exception of one gifted poet in our class, most of our first attempts to monitor our aesthetic responses were rather pitiful. "Was tut der Text?" asked a question for which we had never previously held ourselves accountable, that we were not accustomed to answering, and for which we apparently had no suitable language. Our tendency was to slip directly into habits of analytical commentary concerning what the text "meant." It took repeated attempts, much group encouragement, and a considerable amount of discipline to focus on our own aesthetic responses to texts. More importantly, however, there emerged a capacity to recognize figures of ethos that were available to us as readers. Although we ultimately failed in our attempts to articulate our aesthetic responses to texts, we did manage to convert the subject positions from which we could read and write texts in ways that became "radically reorienting."

---

[7] I appreciate Rebekka Habermas for this phrase from her lecture in Zürich, March 2005.

***Peroratio* by Way of Conclusion**
>Denn ich habe mich damit auch als einen bekannt,
>der nicht ganz kann, was er zu können wünscht.
>Ludwig Wittgenstein
>*Vermischte Bemerkungen (p. 53)*

In this essay I have relied on rhetorical devices to gesture toward the ineffable for figuring out Other education. In the process, new educational problems have surfaced for me. As a way of wrapping up without summing up, I conclude here by sketching three meaningful educational problems that I have only just begun to perceive and that remain unspeakable.

Building Ethical Muscles
Most educators hope that education will help to cultivate ethical relationships among people. Ethics are usually regarded as dispositions, which are notoriously difficult to teach because knowledge about ethics is not the same thing as "the tendency to treat people with respect." I have begun to think about cultivating ethics in terms of building muscles (Hawhee, 2002).

Ethics education that relies on hypothetical cases is like lifting weights; it may strengthen some thinking muscles. But weightlifting does not help us develop the ability to respond appropriately to another person in a real-life encounter. We might be able to strengthen *analytical* muscles by engaging in solitary exercises or thought experiments. However, we cannot strengthen *ethical* muscles that way; we need at least one other person with whom to practice ethics. Ethics are by definition relational. We cannot form a personal relationship with a thought experiment or uphold the inherent dignity of a hypothetical case. We don't have to worry about hurting the feelings of a case study or offending a hypothetical example. Therefore we cannot build ethical muscles using a curriculum of hypothetical case studies. We also cannot build ethical muscles by confining our conversations to safe or trivial topics. We can only build ethical muscles if we have conversations about high-stakes, ego-threatening, and emotionally charged problems in repeated interactions with real people focusing on sensitive, challenging, and deeply personal issues.

The problem with building ethical muscles is that all participants risk some potentially serious loss – loss of security and/or loss of face. Such loss is usually harmful. So the conditions that are necessary for building ethical muscles set up a pedagogically indefensible situation. I am morally obligated to educate in a way that builds ethical muscles, and I am also morally obligated to do everything possible to prevent harm. I don't know how to accomplish both of those things at the same time.

Intellectual Intimacy
This term may be related to traditional educational objectives; however "community building" and "cooperative learning" do not connote the courageous vulnerability that is at stake in the term intellectual intimacy. Intellectual intimacy is related to a particular kind of honesty, maybe close to *parrhesia,*[8] which is also called *fearless* speech.

I have been a writing teacher for more than 30 years. Learning to write typically involves trying on different personas while struggling to come up with a voice that feels like "me." This invention of self through writing (*autopoiesis*) is one of the most challenging and exciting aspects of a writer's life, but experimentations with voice customarily occur behind closed doors in the privacy of one's personal computer.

Web 2.0 communication technologies, however, now make it possible to make the intimate details of our writing processes frighteningly public. When I teach with shared documents (e.g., GoogleDocs), everyone else can actually watch me write: they can track my cursor, witness deletions and additions in real time, and compare older drafts with newer drafts. What could be a more effective way to teach writing than to allow students to watch me write in the most authentic way? In a shared document, students can witness the cascades of revisions, wholesale deletions, countless rearrangements, occasional insights, and rafts of embarrassing mistakes that inevitably occur during any writing process.

So why have I so often been unwilling to make my personal writing process available for students to watch? Web 2.0 technologies make this kind of intimacy not only possible but also very easy, and yet I often compose off-line and then paste onto the shared document, thereby denying students the opportunity to share in the details of my writing process. To make my writing process publicly available in a class would not violate any ethical commitment; it would not be professionally inappropriate or morally offensive in any way, and (under most circumstances) there would be virtually no danger of my suffering ridicule or loss of respect. So why wouldn't I make my writing process accessible to the class, especially when I am aware of the likelihood that such openness could be powerfully beneficial for others who are learning to write? I now have to face a disturbing question about intellectual intimacy: as a writing teacher, what does it mean that I would hesitate to make my writing process openly available even when I know that I am thereby withholding some potentially valuable education?

Generosity
We may associate generosity with giving, but not all acts of giving are generous.

---

[8] *Parrhesia* is a particular kind of truth telling that implies some risk to the speaker for being honest. See, e.g., Foucault, 2011; Zembylas & Fendler, 2007.

Some giving comes with strings attached, and those are not generous. I am confounded by the relationship between generosity and sacrifice. Generosity cannot be defined in empirical terms because we cannot tell by looking whether a gift comes with the expectation of payback. Generosity seems like a spiritual quality to me, and language fails quite miserably whenever I try to talk about spirituality in education.

I suspect that generosity is practically inconceivable in the ideological context of capitalism. Generosity is an anti-economic concept, which is almost impossible to imagine. It's like trying to conceive of the fact that the universe is 70 percent Dark Energy. I know it is true, but I don't know how to wrap my mind around it, never mind figure out how to incorporate it into my teaching.

Yet generosity may be what I value most in education, which is a dilemma: How can I value something that I cannot talk about or even begin to grasp? I had an encounter with this fundamental value at a recent conference when Jan Jaap Rothuizen asked me the stunning question, "What happens when you are met with generosity?" This question currently serves as my lodestone for imagining other education.

References

Aristotle. *Rhetoric*. Online version compiled by Lee Honeycutt. Available: http://rhetoric.eserver.org/aristotle/

Bingham, C. & Biesta, G.J-J. with Jacques Rancière (2010). *Jacques Rancière: Education, truth, emancipation.* London/New York: Continuum.

Foucault, M. (2011). *The courage of truth: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1983-1984.* G. Burchell (Trans.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hawhee, D. (2002). Bodily pedagogies: Rhetoric, athletics, and the Sophists' three Rs. *College English, 65*(2), 142-162.

Perloff, M. (1996). *Wittgenstein's ladder: Poetic language and the strangeness of the ordinary.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rancière, J. (1991). *The ignorant schoolmaster: Five lessons in intellectual emancipation.* K. Ross (Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Rancière, J. (2006). *The Politics of aesthetics*. London: Continuum.

Wittgenstein, L. (1977). *Vermischte Bemerkungen.* Berlin: Suhrkamp.

Zembylas, M. & Fendler, L. (2007). Reframing emotion in education through lenses of *parrhesia* and *care of the self. Studies in Philosophy and Education, 26*(4), 319-333.

Acknowledgements

Author Details
Lynn Fendler is Associate Professor of Teacher Education at Michigan State University. Contact address: Department of Teacher Education, 620 Farm Lane #362, East Lansing, MI, 48824, U.S.A. E-mail: <u>fendler@msu.edu</u>.